stag hunt example international relations

[36] Colin S. Gray, The Arms Race Phenomenon, World Politics, 24, 1(1971): 39-79 at 41. [23] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Pathways to Banning Fully Autonomous Weapons, United Nations, October 23, 2017, https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/pathways-to-banning-fully-autonomous-weapons/. Table 3. The stag is the reason the United States and its NATO allies grew concerned with Afghanistans internal political affairs in the first place, and they remain invested in preventing networks, such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, from employing Afghan territory as a base. The real peril of a hasty withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, though, can best be understood in political, not military, terms. However, both hunters know the only way to successfully hunt a stag is with the other's help. As new technological developments bring us closer and closer to ASI[27] and the beneficial returns to AI become more tangible and lucrative, a race-like competition between key players to develop advanced AI will become acute with potentially severe consequences regarding safety. [30] Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security. Report for Harvard Kennedy School: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2017, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf: 71-110. 695 0 obj Landing The Job You Want Through YourNetwork, Earth Day: Using game theory and AI to beat thepoachers, Adopting to Facebooks new Like Alternative. Moreover, they also argue that pursuing all strategies at once would also be suboptimal (or even impossible due to mutual exclusivity), making it even more important to know what sort of game youre playing before pursuing a strategy[59]. These are a few basic examples of modeling IR problems with game theory. trailer This could be achieved through signaling lack of effort to increase an actors military capacity (perhaps by domestic bans on AI weapon development, for example). The game is a prototype of the social contract. Evidence from AI Experts (2017: 11-21), retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.08807. This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. Despite the damage it could cause, the impulse to go it alone has never been far off, given the profound uncertainties that define the politics of any war-torn country. For the painting about stag hunting, see, In this symmetric case risk dominance occurs if (. The ultimate resolution of the war in Afghanistan will involve a complex set of interlocking bargains, and the presence of U.S. forces represents a key political instrument in those negotiations. On the other hand, real life examples of poorly designed compensation structures that create organizational inefficiencies and hinder success are not uncommon. THE STAG HUNT THE STAG HUNT T HE Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. In this model, each actors incentives are not fully aligned to support mutual cooperation and thus should present worry for individuals hoping to reduce the possibility of developing a harmful AI. For instance if a=10, b=5, c=0, and d=2. For example, if the two international actors cooperate with one another, we can expect some reduction in individual payoffs if both sides agree to distribute benefits amongst each other. As stated before, achieving a scenario where both actors perceive to be in a Stag Hunt is the most desirable situation for maximizing safety from an AI catastrophe, since both actors are primed to cooperate and will maximize their benefits from doing so. These talks involve a wide range of Afghanistans political elites, many of whom are often painted as a motley crew of corrupt warlords engaged in tribalized opportunism at the expense of a capable government and their own countrymen. Because of its capacity to radically affect military and intelligence systems, AI research becomes an important consideration in national security and would unlikely be ignored by political and military leaders. And, seeing how successful the stag hunters are, most hare hunters will convert to stag hunters. [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. In this section, I briefly argue that state governments are likely to eventually control the development of AI (either through direct development or intense monitoring and regulation of state-friendly companies)[29], and that the current landscape suggests two states in particular China and the United States are most likely to reach development of an advanced AI system first. endstream endobj 76 0 obj <>stream Use integration to find the indicated probabilities. For example, can the structure of distribution impact an actors perception of the game as cooperation or defection dominated (if so, should we focus strategic resources on developing accountability strategies that can effectively enforce distribution)? [39] D. S. Sorenson, Modeling the Nuclear Arms Race: A Search for Stability, Journal of Peace Science 4 (1980): 16985. If they both work to drain it they will be successful, but if either fails to do his part the meadow will not be drained. [58] Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation, 143-144. This variant of the game may end with the trust rewarded, and it may result with the trusting party alone receiving full penalty, thus, leading to a new game of revenge. Author James Cambias describes a solution to the game as the basis for an extraterrestrial civilization in his 2014 science fiction book A Darkling Sea. The Stag-hunt is probably more useful since games in life have many equilibria, and its a question of how you can get to the good ones. a Additionally, Koubi[42] develops a model of military technological races that suggests the level of spending on research and development varies with changes in an actors relative position in a race. .more Dislike Share Noah Zerbe 6.48K subscribers They can cheat on the agreement and hope to gain more than the first nation, but if the both cheat, they both do very poorly. One example payoff structure that results in a Prisoners Dilemma is outlined in Table 7. Although most authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context in which to study cooperation and its problems (for an overview see Skyrms 2004). Together, these elements in the arms control literature suggest that there may be potential for states as untrusting, rational actors existing in a state of international anarchy to coordinate on AI development in order to reduce future potential global harms. This distribution variable is expressed in the model as d, where differing effects of distribution are expressed for Actors A and B as dA and dB respectively.[54]. Often, games with a similar structure but without a risk dominant Nash equilibrium are called assurance games. Both actors see the potential harms from developing AI to be significant greater than the potential benefits, but expect that cooperating to develop AI could still result in a positive benefit for both parties. Carol M. Rose argues that the stag hunt theory is useful in 'law and humanities' theory. The familiar Prisoners Dilemma is a model that involves two actors who must decide whether to cooperate in an agreement or not. Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate Created Date: 20160809151831Z The academic example is the Stag Hunt. Does a more optimistic/pessimistic perception of an actors own or opponents capabilities affect which game model they adopt? This table contains a sample ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Stag Hunt game. Back to the lionesses in Etosha National Park . LTgC9Nif This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a game in Deadlock. Using game theory as a way of modelingstrategicallymotivated decisions has direct implications for understanding basic international relations issues. Based on the values that each actor assigns to their payoff variables, we can expect different coordination models (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) to arise. Specifically, it is especially important to understand where preferences of vital actors overlap and how game theory considerations might affect these preferences. The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. These remain real temptations for a political elite that has survived decades of war by making deals based on short time horizons and low expectations for peace. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. Individuals, factions and coalitions previously on the same pro-government side have begun to trade accusations with one another. I discuss in this final section the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory outlined above in practice. An example of norm enforcement provided by Axelrod (1986: 1100) is of a man hit in the face with a bottle for failing to support a lynching in the Jim Crow South. If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry. If either hunts a stag alone, the chance of success is minimal. Rabbits come in the form of different opportunities for short-term gain by way of graft, electoral fraud, and the threat or use of force. In game theory, the stag hunt, sometimes referred to as the assurance game, trust dilemma or common interest game, describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. 0000003265 00000 n The United States is in the hunt, too. The question becomes, why dont they always cheat? Moreover, the AI Coordination Regime is arranged such that Actor B is more likely to gain a higher distribution of AIs benefits. He found various theories being proposed, suggesting a level analysis problem. This technological shock factor leads actors to increase weapons research and development and maximize their overall arms capacity to guard against uncertainty. Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. Table 5. Why do trade agreements even exist? To what extent does today's mainstream media provide us with an objective view of war? [45] Colin S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, (Cornell Univ. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 10. If all the hunters work together, they can kill the stag and all eat. Prisoners Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, and Chicken are discussed in our text. Stag hunt definition: a hunt carried out to find and kill stags | Meaning, pronunciation, translations and examples Payoff matrix for simulated Stag Hunt. Economic Theory of Networks at Temple University, Economic theory of networks course discussion. Let us call a stag hunt game where this condition is met a stag hunt dilemma. PxF`4f$CN*}S -'2Y72Dl0%^JOG?Y,XT@ dF6l]+$.~Qrjj}46.#Z x^iyY2)/c lLU[q#r)^X In international relations, examples of Chicken have included the Cuban Missile Crisis and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction in nuclear arms development. <> Read about me, or email me. Even doing good can parallel with bad consequences. What should Franks do? They suggest that new weapons (or systems) that derive from radical technological breakthroughs can render a first strike more attractive, whereas basic arms buildups provide deterrence against a first strike. The payoff matrix in Figure 1 illustrates a generic stag hunt, where [7] E.g. In a security dilemma, each state cannot trust the other to cooperate. A relevant strategy to this insight would be to focus strategic resources on shifting public or elite opinion to recognize the catastrophic risks of AI. Charisma unifies people supposedly because people aim to be as successful as the leader. Here, values are measured in utility. This situation is often seen as a useful analogy for many kinds of social cooperation, such as international agreements on climate change.[1]. Actor As preference order: DC > DD > CC > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > DD > CC > DC. By failing to agree to a Coordination Regime at all [D,D], we can expect the chance of developing a harmful AI to be highest as both actors are sparing in applying safety precautions to development. <<3B74F05AAAB3B2110A0010B6ACF6FC7F>]/Prev 397494>> However, in Deadlock, the prospect of both actors defecting is more desirable than both actors cooperating. Downs et al. Julian E. Barnes and Josh Chin, The New Arms Race in AI, Wall Street Journal, March 2, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-arms-race-in-ai-1520009261; Cecilia Kang and Alan Rappeport, The New U.S.-China Rivalry: A Technology Race, March 6, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/business/us-china-trade-technology-deals.html. The remainder of this subsection looks at numerical simulations that result in each of the four models and discusses potential real-world hypotheticals these simulations might reflect. f(x)={332(4xx2)if0x40otherwisef(x)= \begin{cases}\frac{3}{32}\left(4 x-x^2\right) & \text { if } 0 \leq x \leq 4 \\ 0 & \text { otherwise }\end{cases} Each model is differentiated primarily by the payoffs to cooperating or defecting for each international actor. Namely, the probability of developing a harmful AI is greatest in a scenario where both actors defect, while the probability of developing a harmful AI is lowest in a scenario where both actors cooperate. Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. For example, one prisone r may seemingly betray the other , but without losing the other's trust. In the long term, environmental regulation in theory protects us all, but even if most of the countries sign the treaty and regulate, some like China and the US will not forsovereigntyreasons, or because they areexperiencinggreat economic gain. Each player must choose an action without knowing the choice of the other. As we discussed in class, the catch is that the players involved must all work together in order to successfully hunt the stag and reap the rewards once one person leaves the hunt for a hare, the stag hunt fails and those involved in it wind up with nothing. A common example of the Prisoners Dilemma in IR is trade agreements. [56] look at three different types of strategies governments can take to reduce the level of arms competition with a rival: (1) a unilateral strategy where an actors individual actions impact race dynamics (for example, by focusing on shifting to defensive weapons[57]), (2) a tacit bargaining strategy that ties defensive expenditures to those of a rival, and (3) a negotiation strategy composed of formal arms talks.

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